Author: Randy

U.S. v. Veatch (Oklahoma City, OK, 1993): The Court determined the defendant incompetent who was diagnosed with a personality disorder; despite the defendant possessing factual and rational understanding of courtroom procedure they were unable to work with their attorney.

State v. Perry (Supreme Court, 1992): The Court ruled you cannot force an inmate on death row who is incompetent to be executed to be medicated in order to restore his competency to be executed.

Ford v. Wainwright (Supreme Court, 1986): The Court ruled that an insane person (they meant an incompetent person) cannot be put to death.  They found that the common law against condoning the execution of the insane — that such an execution has questionable retributive power, presents no example to others, has no deterrence value and offends humanity.  The test for competence to be executed enunciated in Justice Powell’s concurring opinion is whether the prisoner is aware of his impending execution and the reason for it.

Sell v. U.S. (Supreme Court, 2003): The Supreme Court determined medication to restore competency to stand trial for serious offenses could be administered involuntarily under certain circumstances. Competency evaluators often must offer an opinion regarding the defendant receiving medication against their will provided it met specific criteria “Sell criteria”, the criteria is essentially adopted from a previous case Riggins v. Nevada (see also Washington v. Harper) regarding forced medication for inmates with mental disorder who became a danger to themselves or others. Sell Criteria includes: (1) An important government issue must be at stake and only a case by case inquiry can determine whether the government’s interest is mitigated by the possibility of a long civil commitment for the treatment of the mental illness or by the fact that long periods of confinement have already been served, as this would be subtracted from any criminal sentence. (2) There must be a substantial probability that the medication will enable the defendant to become competent without substantial undermining side effects. (3) The medication must be necessary to restore the defendant’s competency, with no alternative, less intrusive procedures available that would produce the same results.

Colorado v. Connelly (Supreme Court, 1986): The Supreme Court determined competency to confess is dependent on whether or not: (1) The confession is VOLUNTARY and free from susceptible coercion; (2) Waiver of Miranda Rights is voluntary, and (3) The defendant’s reliability is impaired by any mental disability. Statements made by defendants are admissible regardless of mental state unless the defendant did not understand their Miranda rights (The right to remain silent).

North Carolina v. Alford (Supreme Court, 1970): The Supreme Court held a guilty plea is valid if it is a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent choice among alternatives. Choosing to enter a “Best interest” plea (Often to avoid a harsh penalty) is known as an Alford Plea.

Wilson v. U.S. (DC Circuit of Appeals, 1968): The ruling established fair trial guidelines for judges regarding the evaluation of a person with amnesia. It was determined amnesia alone does not render a defendant incompetent to stand trial. Several factors must be considered when determining competency of an amnestic defendant, including: (1) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant’s ability to consult with and assist his lawyer, (2) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant’s ability to testify in his own behalf, (3) The extent to which the evidence in suit could be extrinsically reconstructed in view of the defendant’s amnesia. Such evidence would include evidence relating to the crime itself as well as any reasonably possible alibi, (4) The extent to which the Government assisted the defendant and his counsel in that reconstruction, (5) The strength of the prosecution’s case. Most important here will be whether the Government’s case is such as to negate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. If there is any substantial possibility that the accused could, but for his amnesia, establish an alibi or other defense, it should be presumed that he would have been able to do so, and (6) Any other facts and circumstances which would indicate whether or not the defendant had a fair trial. 

Jackson v. Indiana (Supreme Court, 1972): The Supreme Court ruled incompetent defendants could not be committed indefinitely. A defendant committed to a mental hospital based solely on the account of incompetency to stand trial cannot be held for more than a reasonable period of time necessary to determine if they will attain competency in the future. “Due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” Following a reasonable period of time if the defendant is unlikely to be restored to competency they must either be civilly committed through proceedings applicable to those not charged with a crime or be released. Failure to release is a violation of due process (14^th Amendment).

Estelle v. Smith (Supreme Court, 1981): The Supreme Court determined information obtained in a court-ordered competency to stand trial evaluation regarding the issue of future dangerousness was inadmissible at the penalty phase of the trial. The Court held the evidence was a violation of the 5^th Amendment right against self-incrimination and the 6^th Amendment right to counsel (Since counsel was not informed in advance that the examination would cover the issue of future dangerousness). Furthermore, the Court noted there is no distinction between the guilt and penalty phase of the trial regarding the defendant’s rights. Information obtained during a court ordered competency evaluation could not be considered “Freely and voluntarily” given unless the defendant had been informed of their rights.

Godinez v. Moran (Supreme Court, 1993): The Supreme Court determined the competency standard for a defendant to plead guilty or waive the right to counsel does not have to be higher or different from the Dusky Standard for Competency to Stand Trial. The Court held the decision to plead guilty is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions a defendant would make during the course of a trial (Whether to testify, waive a jury trial, or cross-examining witnesses for the prosecution). The decision to waive counsel did not require appreciably higher levels of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights. The Court held the standard did not need to be higher as it had no bearing upon the defendant’s competency to CHOOSE to represent himself. The Court’s decision is a reflection of the competency to WAIVE right to counsel, no the ability to represent oneself. The Court also determined opining competence was not all that was necessary before the defendant could enter a plea of guilty or waive right to counsel. The Trial Court must determine the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This case superseded Seiling v. Eyman which set the former standard for Competency to Plead Guilty as the “Reasoned choice” standard.